The US capture of the Venezuelan president and his wife raised serious questions around the world about sovereignty and the stability of the international order – its proclamations regarding Greenland added fuel to that fire. Cambodia’s public positioning on the US operation can be read as part of a strategy emphasising territorial integrity in the context of recent border disputes with neighbouring Thailand. With the international order seemingly in flux, what is Cambodia’s short- and medium-term foreign policy calculus?

Introduction

In January, President Donald Trump framed the capture of the Venezuelan president and his wife as part of a law enforcement and national security mission. Venezuela’s government condemned the raid as a violation of national sovereignty, while the international community debated the operation’s legality and its implications for regional stability.

Since Trump’s return to office, the US government’s rhetoric regarding the semi-autonomous territory of Greenland has also intensified, with suggestions that Washington might seek control of the island on security grounds. Although a “framework of a future deal” has been declared that rules out military intervention, scepticism remains.

These developments will be scrutinised in Phnom Penh (and Bangkok) as signals regarding the degree of (dis)respect the Trump administration holds for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of small states, and for unilateral intervention. This matters because these are precisely the issues at stake between Cambodia and Thailand following the 2025 border disputes. Both governments will be reading carefully between the lines to gauge the direction of US policy and the robustness of international law and norms.

Global Reactions to the US Capture of Nicolás Maduro

The abduction of a sitting president constituted both a violation of Venezuelan sovereignty and the UN Charter – the move lacked both UN Security Council authorisation and Venezuelan consent. It generated anxiety about great-power unilateralism and the erosion of territorial integrity norms.

Major international actors were quick to condemn the operation. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasised that a country’s ‘sovereignty and security’ must be protected under international law, while the UN Secretary-General warned that the action could set a ‘dangerous precedent’. Several ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) leaders also expressed opposition, invoking international law and the UN Charter. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim described the operation as a clear violation of international law, while Thailand urged that disputes be resolved in ways that are consistent with established norms.

The Cambodian Calculus

What options does Cambodia have in this shifting landscape, and how might these developments feed into its short- and medium-term strategy for managing its own border disputes with Thailand?

On 17 January, Cambodia’s foreign ministry issued a statement noting that it was following developments in Venezuela with ‘serious concerns’. The language was significant, signalling that the country is an upholder of the ‘respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states…’

Undoubtedly, the recent Thai incursions into Cambodian territory will have been prominent in the minds of Prime Minister Hun Manet and his administration. In July and December 2025, border disputes escalated into armed and deadly clashes, accompanied by the displacement of civilians. Although the initial ceasefire faltered, a second was signed in December, with the Cambodian government continuing to emphasise peaceful resolution in line with international law.

While the artillery has fallen silent, sovereignty issues persist. Many Cambodian families remain unable to return home due to the presence of Thai troops and infrastructure obstructing access to their land. Government spokesperson Pen Bona has reiterated that ‘The Royal Government of Cambodia does not recognise any changes to the boundary line resulting from the use of force’.

In the short-term, Cambodia seeks the withdrawal of Thai troops and the safe return of its displaced citizens. In the medium to long term, it aims to stabilise the border through mechanisms reinforced by international law.

This presents Cambodia with a fundamental tension in the contemporary international order: the principle of state sovereignty on one hand, and how that principle is practised by major powers on the other. The Venezuela operation may be interpreted as a loosening of constraints against external intervention, while shifting US messaging (here and here) on Greenland suggests the selective prioritisation of sovereignty norms. For a small state, this raises concerns that international norms are increasingly malleable, complicating Phnom Penh’s legal and strategic arguments in its dispute with Thailand and potentially encouraging a defensive posture grounded in firm appeals to international law.

Alternatively, Cambodia could seek to leverage growing anxiety about great-power unilateralism. In an environment where the will of strongest risks determining outcomes, Phnom Penh could channel this unease to rally ASEAN and UN support, positioning itself as an advocate for the continued relevance of international law and order.

This approach is not without challenges. While ASEAN leaders have invoked UN and ASEAN charters in response to both the Venezuela affair and the Thai-Cambodian border dispute, the bloc’s institutional emphasis on on-interference and consensus can limit its capacity to respond decisively to sovereignty violations or intra-regional conflicts.

Nevertheless, opportunities remain. Cambodia can persist in framing its dispute with Thailand in terms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law, hoping that this sustained emphasis mobilises regional and global opinion, reinforces legal norms as a deterrent to military intervention, and builds diplomatic legitimacy. By contrasting its claims with violations elsewhere, Phnom Penh can argue for the consistent application of international standards.

The border disputes have also demonstrated that the defence of territorial rights resonates strongly with the Cambodian public. Managed carefully, a sovereignty narrative may strengthen domestic political cohesion and government legitimacy without escalating rhetoric.

US actions in Venezuela and rhetoric on Greenland illustrate how great powers may interpret sovereignty selectively when it serves their interests. As with the US’s trade war, Cambodia could use these developments to justify diversifying its partnerships, strengthening ties with ASEAN neighbours, China, the US, and EU members in pursuit of security guarantees and diplomatic backing and security assurances.

Conclusion:

To secure its borders, Cambodia must navigate great-power geopolitics while asserting the inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This will require diplomatic dexterity, engagement with international law, and skilful framing of its disputes within the broader debates about global order.